By FRANK PHIPPS

Democracy is alive when political opposition is awake.

Leader of the Opposition Dr Peter Phillips was a lone voice pointing out that recent developments in the performance of Jamaica public sector indicate there are major gaps in our governance structure that have to be addressed if the system is to become less prone to abuse and manipulation. The argument is directed at curing partisan political bias in the management of human resources in the central government, which comprises ministries, departments, and particular agencies that rest within the Public Service Commission (the PSC). This was as a result of the fall out-in the Energy Ministry where the Minister was forced out of office. Other organisations are now joining the call for change in governance, bringing too little, too late.

I would respectfully submit, corruption from partisan political bias in the management of central government affairs goes further than the functions of the Public Service Commission. The disease lies deeper in the constitutional structure where the Cabinet is allowed to function without effective accountability for its actions.

The Cabinet is the principal instrument of policy, charged with the general direction and control of the Government and are collectively responsible therefore to Parliament..  This is where decisions are made for distribution of the nation’s resources, and this is where the temptation for partisan political bias in the planning and execution of governmental functions will raise its head.

The present practice where the majority of Cabinet Ministers are appointed from the House of Representatives, creates a conflict of interests in governance, when, as Minister of Cabinet, he accounts to himself in the chamber of Parliament where he sits as an elected member to monitor his own conduct. The mingling of executive functions with legislative responsibility is a recipe for mismanagement with a temptation for partisan political bias in the distribution of the nation’s resources- the supreme act of corruption in governance. 

A corruption of conscience

A Cabinet appointed in that manner will function without accountability to a separate, independent and autonomous body of the people’s representatives within the Constitution.  This will eventually end in what National Hero, Norman Manley, called a corruption of conscience where a sense of right and wrong is compromised. It was painful to hear about the run with it ritual by a minister of government, telling party supporters how governmental policy was fashioned to ensure a return to office at an election. This is corruption carried out by partisan political bias, exactly what Dr Phillips seeks to clean up, but in a limited way.

Before undertaking any further altering of the constitution, there needs to be a scheme whereby appointments to the Cabinet are made from among persons with the requisite qualification, skill and experience in the area of the particular portfolio responsibility assigned to them without having constituency responsibility.  It is critically important that the appointment of cabinet ministers should not be from among the elected members of Parliament that creates problems for mismanagement in governance. In this new approach to governance, it is necessary to debunk the notion from the British colonial past where the nominated Senate is the Upper House, imitating the House of Lords in the UK, serving as a review chamber for Parliament. The contrived elitism belittles the authority of the people’s representatives in a democracy. 

To make better use of the Senate, cabinet ministers should be appointed to the Senate, uninfluenced by returns at the polls for elections to qualify for the appointment. The policies for governance will be crafted by the Cabinet and presented to that chamber for review with the opposition nominees for screening against partisan political bias, and, thereafter, sent to the House of Representatives for approval without the members there touching or having physical control over the distribution of resources.  Parliament is where both arms of Government, the executive and the legislature, function together but do not mix for accountability by the Cabinet.

Making the change

This new approach to governance will require two small amendments to the Constitution that can be done by a simple majority vote in Parliament. One, to delete the provision at section 70(1) for the selection of ministers from among the members of the two houses. Two, to delete the provision at section 69(3) for the limit of four for Cabinet Ministers selected from Senate. These changes would free up Parliament, i.e. the Senate and the House, to perform the role for a check on the Cabinet.  

The Constitution provides for Estimate and Expenditure of the nation’s funds are to be laid before the House by the minister responsible for finance (sections 115 – 118).  Section 115 for the annual Estimate of expenditure is not entrenched and can be altered by a simple majority vote to allow for the Estimate to be laid before the Senate for consideration; whereas, sections 116-118 that deal with the expenditure of funds are entrenched in the constitution for this function to remain with the elected house, as it should be, to secure the primacy of the people’s representatives to authorise the expenditure of the nation’s resources without themselves touching it.

An immediate benefit from the change will be the size of the Cabinet that will be limited to 13 members, the maximum amount the government can appoint to the Senate plus 1- the Prime Minister as provided at section 69. A Cabinet of thirteen capable ministers with the traditional Civil Service would go a far way to reduce the number of other public bodies required for administration. Money so saved could be used in other areas of the administration where it is sorely needed, including to increase the pay for MPs – making their allowance no less than a minister’s. 

The most important benefit will undoubtedly be the improvement and the strengthening of efficiency in performance by public officials who no longer will be looking over their shoulder to please the MP.  Temptation to misbehave from partisan political motives at both levels for the planning and the approval for distribution of funds to run the government would be reduced and spurious allegations of corruption that require government wasting time and resources to pursue the phantom that guides irresponsible opposition, would be eliminated.

The proposals are not made to cast aspersion or to belittle the abilities of the elected members of Parliament. Instead, they will turn around the process to allow members to give their undivided attention to the primary, solemn and supreme obligation to represent the people in a democracy, especially to control Executive conduct that advance partisan political considerations in the management of the country’s affairs.

Successive Governments have always been bothered, and at times frustrated, by allegations of partisan political bias in governance and will lose the confidence of the public when they do not deal with corruption in imaginative ways to dispel the curse.

 Frank Phipps QC is an Attorney- at -Law